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ABSTRACT 
Information technologies (IT) have a substantively differential effect in developed countries than in less developed countries. 
This is illustrated through case studies of public and private institutions from Venezuela, Brazil, and Panama. The case 
method is used because it provides a richer understanding of the phenomenon and because there are factors structurally 
linked to the lesser development that both hinder a quantitative analysis and obstruct a proper managerial analysis that would 
permit a similar profiting from the technology. An analysis of the commonalities in the cases shows how the theoretical 
concepts of pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic dimension of information can be used to conceptualize why less developed 
countries cannot benefit from the use of IT in the same way as developed countries do. Thus, we conclude that due to the 
pragmatic fragility present in less developed countries, advanced IT will not reduce but increase the digital divide. 
Keywords 
Information technology, information systems, information theory, developing countries, digital divide. 
INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries have hardly contributed to the pool of IT/IS. IT/IS is often ignored or even mocked at in developing 
countries and when embraced, it is generally in a peculiar mode of a consumer of imported “fashions” from the large world 
centers of production (e.g. Wilson 2001). Furthermore, some countries are avoiding IT/IS because their leaders see it as a 
globalization tool used by developed nations to indoctrinate and put a curb on the development of the poor ones. 
Unfortunately, the foregoing observations contradict the hope expressed by many (e.g. Nevin 2002) who expect information 
technologies -and the Internet in particular- to reduce the breach between the rich and the poor nations who long ago lost 
every hope of catching up by the process of industrialization. 
Communication technologies are believed to lower barriers of entry because what a decade ago used to take years, now can 
take only months or weeks and cost a small fraction of what they used to cost (Peha 1999). Still, the communication 
infrastructure, the part of the information revolution that is easily implemented, is only a relatively small part of what is 
needed to successfully surf the information revolution (Lane 1997). 
E-commerce is expected to reach over six trillion dollars in the US alone in 2004 (Forrester Research Inc. 2003); however, 
the gains in efficiency obtained by developed countries by using e-commerce and other forms of advanced IT have yet to be 
duplicated in less developed countries which is the basis for what we commonly call the Digital Divide (Simon 2004). A very 
clear example of the Digital Divide is the fact that about 75% of all e-commerce is done in the US today and that the US 
accounts for 90% of all commercial Web sites (Iyer et al. 2002). On the other hand, Africa lacks most of the advanced 
information and communication technologies (Nevin 2002). However, many developing countries are trying to take 
advantage of advanced IT by skip the industrialization phase and trying to go from a primarily agricultural economy directly 
into a service oriented one by using advanced IT (Bhatnagar 1999). 
This article complements a prior article by the authors (Ferran et al. 2004) by discussing e-business as a type or dimension of 
information that we call pragmatic information. Based on it, we show how the use of IT/IS on business has the same 
advantages and disadvantages than its use on any other type of pragmatic information. This effect of IT/IS on pragmatic 
information is true for both developed and underdeveloped countries. However, we will illustrate how the lack of (or 
deficient) complementary infrastructures (like that of a broad set of Laws that properly regulate the activities, a fair and 
accessible judicial system to enforce them, a comprehensive transportation infrastructure for moving the matter exchanged, 
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and other traditional services) preclude underdeveloped countries from benefiting from IT/IS in the same way as developed 
countries do. 
METHODOLOGY 
The study of IS/IT in less developed countries is constrained by various forms of peculiar cultural, social, and political 
practices. While the technology used is the same, its use in real life is intermixed with those practices and sometimes the 
boundaries between technology, phenomenon, and context are not clear. Added to this confounding is the lack of trustworthy 
statistical information; a deficiency that is structurally linked to less developed countries based on factors inherent to that lack 
of development.  
Factors that hinder quantitative analysis in less developed countries 
By definition less developed countries do not count with the same infrastructure and superstructure that are present in 
developed countries. Some of these hinder any quantitative analysis that we may want to do to compare developed and less 
developed countries. However, the problem is not only for analysts but also for management. Proper management requires 
those same numbers to make key management decision. Some of those factors are: 
Lack of Benchmarks 
The first factor is a complete lack of benchmarks. Organizations in less developed countries argue that they cannot be 
compared with similar organizations located in developed countries. Some of their arguments are valid; mainly those based 
on the lack of benchmarks for activities in their environment. This is compounded by the fact that many of the economic 
indexes of their environment are conflictive and many times untrustworthy. However, many of the arguments are nothing 
else than excuses to explain notorious deficiencies.  
The lack of benchmarks allows the organization to claim achievements that cannot be compared to that of other 
organizations; triumphs which in some cases are not such but, since they cannot be compared, they cannot be disputed either. 
However, those triumphs are not only claimed at the organizational level. Mid-level managers also make those claims to top 
level management who cannot compare or argue that the results presented where mediocre instead of outstanding. Thus, 
neither stockholders nor top-level managers who are not familiar with IT implementations can critically evaluate the quality, 
efficiency, or effectiveness of the implementation.  
Low Management Accountability 
The second factor is the low management accountability typical of less developed countries and of family owned 
organizations. Accountability would at a minimum assure that the established standards (however low they may be) would 
have to be satisfied. Underdeveloped countries have very little public participation in most companies. Very few companies 
are listed in the stock exchanges. Therefore, most companies are free from public or government control. Very few 
companies undergo a third party audit of their financial statements. In fact, most of the few companies that go through the 
trouble of auditing their statements still keep the statements and audits private. Not even the local offices of multinational 
companies have to publish their sales or projection figures, much less their profit margins. The few indexes and figures 
attributed to those companies are nothing more than gossip, speculations, or assumptions made by specialized media trying to 
make sense of the economic environment. And no matter how professional those publications try to be, it has to be taken into 
consideration that most of the advertisement they publish comes from the same companies that they are trying to evaluate. 
Triple concealment 
The third factor is a triple concealment of the deficiency. It is triple because it involves the technology user (company 
acquiring the technology), the technology supplier, and the auditing (or consulting) firm. They all tend to conceal any 
deficiencies in an IT/IS implementation. The technology user hides the deficiencies because it does not want to associate its 
image (towards stockholders or the public in general) with a deficiency in IT/IS right in the middle of a very sensitive topic 
as modernization. The technology supplier does not want to point out any deficiencies with the same technology that is trying 
to keep on selling nor to add increase its list of dissatisfied customers. Finally the auditing firm while it has the duty of 
reporting the deficiencies it is also very common (in less developed countries) that they already had a stake in the project 
since most of them are initially recommended by the auditing firm. It is only in the rare cases that the auditing firm had no 
involvement in the selection and implementation of the technology that they report deficiencies. However, in most cases they 
end-up involved in the “repair” of those deficiencies and thus loose their independence. 
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Triple concealment is not exclusive of developing countries (ex. Enron and Parmalat); however, they are far more frequent in 
less developed countries. Furthermore, given the lack of benchmarks and the low management accountability it becomes very 
difficult if not impossible to discover the triple concealment. 
The case method 
Culture, customs, and society have to be taken into account for an IT implementation to succeed in Latin America 
(Montealegre 1998, 1999, 2001). The lack of quantitative data and the need for in-depth interpretive and critical research 
makes the case method the ideal methodology to approach this enquire (Walsham 1993; Yin 1994). The case method requires 
an in-depth recollection of what occurs in each case. It provides a rich understanding of what occurred and why; however, 
external validity can always be questioned. Selecting key cases (like selecting key informants in some quantitative methods) 
is crucial to ensure the external validity.  
The cases that follow are only a small selection of many more cases to which we had some level of access1. Our personal 
experience of over 25 years in the field tells us that the selection is quite representative of what happens in less developed 
countries; nonetheless, to increase the external validity of the sample, we showed this selection to a group of 10 expert 
practitioners in less developed countries and got similar responses. 
IT IMPLEMENTTION CASES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Following is a selection of cases on implementation and use of IT in public and private institutions from Venezuela, Brazil, 
and Panama. To maintain some level of confidentiality, the names of the companies and institutions described are fictitious; 
however, everything else -including dates- is authentic. 
Case No. 1: DeptoStore  
Exposition 
This is the case of DeptoStore, a relatively large chain of department stores. In 2000 DeptoStore decided to implement an 
ERP along with its ambitious expansion plan. The ERP selected -developed by a European software manufacturer with 
worldwide reputation as one of the top systems- was very expensive. The local representative prepared the initial budget. It 
was then analyzed and approved by external and independent auditors. However, very early in the implementation phase, the 
budget was found to be notably underestimated. DeptoStore immediately held the local representative and the auditors 
responsible for the problem.  They in turn argued that it was the DeptoStore’s fault since they had not provided the necessary 
documentation for its proper estimation. Furthermore, they also argued that DeptoStore was not making all of the internal 
changes that had been originally agreed in the contract. 
Implementation was suspended and the case brought to trial. The Court decision took over a year and was ambiguous. The 
explanation for such ambiguity was that (1) the presentation made by the parties was also ambiguous and in some cases 
inconsistent, and (2) the Court did not have enough expertise to decide on IT/IS cases.  
DeptoStore declared bankruptcy while waiting for the Court’s decision. It justified the bankruptcy mainly on the 
unmanageable administrative chaos caused by the interruption of the implementation and the excessive direct and indirect 
expenses that the chain incurred for the project. As usual, many versions were given of what really happened. Some said that 
the software house and the external auditors  “swallowed” the customer just with the down payment -which at the end 
resulted in higher earnings than expected since after the bankruptcy they no longer had to provide the services that had 
already been paid for-. Others said that DeptoStore –or at least a part of its stockholders- found a perfect pretext on the 
software manufacturer and the external auditor for blaming a bankruptcy planned long before. At the time of writing this 
article neither versions had been confirmed. At the end, the Court’s decision, instead of helping, made things even more 
confusing. 
                                                          
1 It is also important to disclose that we may have had some level of involvement (developing, selling, implementing, or 
auditing). 
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Analysis 
ERP projects that are initially underestimated from a timing and economic perspective are very common in both developed 
and underdeveloped countries. Resolution of these cases tends to come through private arbitration and therefore public 
records of the details are not generally available. Very few of them end up in court. It is therefore very difficult to determine 
the exact number of disputes; however, most industry publications assert that they are quite high. It is the cases that end up in 
court that show a big difference in the conditions of developed countries and underdeveloped countries. The generalized low 
quality of public justice services in underdeveloped countries become an added burden instead of a solution to the problem. 
In this case there was an opportunity for a technology implementation that would have been highly beneficial for all the 
parties involved. However, as an aborted project, none of the parties gained something from the benefits of information 
technology. Any gain that may have been obtained by the individual parties (no matter how large it was) ended up being 
obscure and detrimental for other IT/IS projects and in general for business development in the area. 
The public relation departments (PR) of all the companies involved exploited the determination of the need for an ERP, the 
selection of a well-known software manufacturer and external auditors, the creation of a large project, and the initial phases 
of implementation. They publicized the quality of their organizations. They argued that they were working towards a more 
up-to-date and technological advanced country. 
Case No. 2: FleetCo 
Exposition 
FleetCo is a transportation company that was facing a serious problem of loosing trucks. The trucks were lost in some cases 
due to driver’s negligence but in others due to external causes like road thieves. In many cases it was not easy to distinguish 
between the two and in most of them, internal complicity of the driver was suspected. In some cases part of the merchandise 
was lost, in others the whole truck was stolen, but the most critical loss was that of control over the fleet. The itineraries were 
not followed. Connections with the next leg of the trip (planes, boats, trains, and even other ground transportation companies) 
were often lost. The clients’ expectations were frequently not met. And last but not least, the cost of insurance was increasing 
to levels that threatened FleetCo’s competitiveness. 
In 2001 FleetCo decided to contract an electronic tracking system from an US-based company. The system would show live 
tracking with an ample sort of graphical and statistical reports to authorized users through Internet connections. Each truck 
would have in a secure place a Global Positioning System (GPS) device that would both send and receive satellite signals. In 
some cases an additional set of communication devices would also be added to reinforce the communication capacity of the 
tracking unit. Furthermore, this device could also, among other things, block the truck ignition system at the request from an 
authorized user of the remote tracking station. This user could also alert local police of any problem. 
Following foreign recommendations, FleetCo requested an online interaction subsystem with insurance companies and local 
police. This subsystem would automatically alert the local police of any type of deviation from the scheduled route which 
would allow them to immediately take local action to visually locate the truck and initiate pursuit if necessary. It was very 
expensive and difficult to develop a subsystem that could interact with all the different local polices and several insurance 
companies. Extensive technical tests were done during the following months. The subsystem was finally approved by the IS 
departments of local police and insurance companies. The subsystem went into production thanks to the expertise of the 
foreign company selling the tracking system; however, a few months later the expensive subsystem was deactivated at 
FleetCo’s request. During those months the quantity and gravity of those looses increased notoriously.  FleetCo had strong 
motives to believe that the many “technical difficulties” were not such. FleetCo believed that the cause was instead an 
increase in the base of internal complicity. Now some corrupt police and insurance company employees were part of the 
scheme. Higher quality and timely information was not only in the hands of the trucking company but also in the hands of 
those that eventually became accomplices in crime. 
Analysis 
It was thought that the extensive technical testing that the subsystem underwent would assure that the probability of 
“technical difficulties” would be very low; nevertheless, it was never possible to determine if the “technical difficulties” 
alleged by local police were really technical or not. Many local norms and procedures –unknown by FleetCo and the foreign 
supplier- did not allow full access to investigators. They encountered lots of “red tape”. From a technical perspective very 
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little was determined regarding the robberies. Very little had the quality of the technology to do with the client’s decision to 
suspend its use (even after having spent so much money and effort to put it in place).  
Case No. 3: CountyGov  
Exposition 
New government always starts by making changes in order to make improvements. In this case the idea was to improve 
management by using IT/IS. The technology selected was the largest and best known American made ERP. The primary 
criteria for selecting the system included the quantity and quality of counties and cities around the world –especially in the so 
called first world countries- that were already using the system successfully. The software developer organized several visits 
for the county officials to several of those foreign places. During those visits the officials closely observed the system 
functionality; particularly that of tax collection (a critical aspect in county management). The final decision was primarily 
based on the tax collection features included in the system. 
The implementation process started very well. CountyGov officials and employees alike were very excited. The excitement 
and high expectations were communicated to tax payers in many different forms; however, problems soon arised. The local 
representative of the software house used a very debatable clause of the contract to argue that the tax collection module was 
not included in the packaged purchased. Therefore, if CountyGov wanted to include the tax collection module a considerable 
increase in the investment was required to cover for additional services, licenses, and other costs. At that point CountyGov 
officials -for political reasons- could not allow public litigation during a highly publicized modernization process. 
Nonetheless, the County could not afford to make the additional investment. The solution found was to outsource tax 
collection. CountyGov selected a local third party that had -at least on paper- the structure, technology, and experience to 
accomplish the task efficiently and a competitive price. This way, the powerful (and expensive) ERP was left to manage the 
rest of the tasks –mainly accounting-, all very important but none as critical to a County as tax collection. 
Analysis 
It is possible that, at the end, CountyGov benefited from the “misunderstanding” with the local representative of the 
American software house. Both from an operation and economic point of view, the local outsourcer seemed to be a very good 
option; particularly when compared to the additional investment required by the software giant. In any case, CountyGov 
officials always acted honestly and very decisively through the entire decision process. However, many decisions were based 
in “gut feeling” and not science since they did not find benchmarks to compare outsourcing to keeping the process internally. 
There are some benchmarks in developed countries; however, they have little meaning in less developed countries were 
uncertainty is not only pervasively found in micro-management but in the whole economy and the political environment in 
general. Furthermore, there are no norms that require their use, procedures that would help them react accordingly, nor 
Courts that would help them enforce them; all of which is very common in less developed countries. 
However, the purpose of this analysis is not to find out whether CountyGov profited from the “misunderstanding” but to see 
how much advantage was made from the IT project contracted.  
Case No. 4: JudCourt and MultinatCo 
Exposition 
This is a double case: it includes a Judicial Court (JudCourt) and a local office of a multinational company (MultinatCo). 
Both were facing critical but similar problems in human resource management (HR). Labor conflicts were common; 
however, most of them were not meant to accomplish labor related claims but to correct internal processes and make them 
more agile; processes that by failing to work timely and accurately were affecting the well being and quality of life of the 
personnel. Many of those conflicts could have been avoided by properly reengineering and computerizing those processes 
that were complex but quite repetitive. Furthermore, at least in the case of JudCourt, the mismanagement of the human 
resource negatively affected the quality of the service provided. The public often raised complaints regarding insufficient or 
delayed attention to their cases.  Moreover, some cases were left aside due to the high turnover rate and lack of a proper 
mechanism to relay the pending work to the new employees. 
Both, JudCourt and MultinatCo, clearly understood that they needed IS/IT to solve a large part of their problem. Nonetheless, 
all government agencies in that developing country as well as all foreign offices of MultinatCo were subject to fixed 
standards in respect to any IT/IS used. They could not just use any application or obtain services from any local supplier.  
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In the case of JudCourt, the standards were too high and restrictive for any local supplier. Moreover, some of the standards 
were so deeply hidden in a separate government office that they did not have access to them and thus did not even know what 
it was they needed to do. In the case of MultinatCo, products and services had to come from the local representative of an IT 
multinational already selected by the main office. However, the local representative was quite limited. It merely acted as an 
import agent and did not provide any additional services or customization. The local representative had no incentive to 
provide more since they knew their condition of a monopoly and became more of an obstacle than a solution provider.  
Both, JudCourt and MultinatCo, opted to fund an alternative information system with surplus of (or at the expense of) other 
accounts. That was because any use of the appropriate accounts would require the dreaded homologation. This budgetary 
artifact forced them to eliminate parts of the system that would have been very useful. It also caused multiple delays in the 
development of the modules that were funded.  On top of that, they also had to find funds to develop an information 
subsystem that would transfer the information from the local application to the homologated applications or at a minimum 
disguise the output to look like if it came from the homologated applications.  
Analysis 
System homologation is generally accepted as a good practice. If not imposed the company soon faces countless islands of 
information. Furthermore, maintenance costs may escalate due to the diversity of applications. On the other hand, when the 
homologation is not viable but still enforced, many requirements go unfulfilled. Thus islands of information do not appear 
not because all systems are interconnected but because there are no systems to interconnect. Instead of the feared archipelago 
we end-up worst, with an ocean with no ground to stand on. Instead of best practices we have malpractice.  
Case No. 5: ElectoralGov 
Exposition 
In a Latin-American country numerous political elections took place between 1999 and 2001.  With that in mind, the 
electoral authority (ElectoralGov) decided to use an automatic voting system. After a not very transparent bidding process, a 
well know European company was selected. The system worked reasonably well; however, the IT provider was blamed for 
the losses of the losers and for the governmental delays prior to the election. The name of the European company became a 
commonly used term to denote corruption in local politics. It was also disqualified by both government and opposition to take 
care of the following elections. 
Analysis 
Automatic voting systems are not very complex. They just: 
a) Validate each entry 
b) Add a one to the selected election option each time it receives a valid entry 
c) Transmit data through a highly secured channel 
d) Offer summary reports 
The validation required on each credit or debit card transaction –used daily by millions of people to make purchases in stores 
throughout the world- is far more complex to that required by the voting system (a). Any operation done by the simplest 
accounting system is more complicated than the addition of one vote to the selected option (b). The electronic fund transfer 
that occurs 24/7 between millions of personal computers requires the same security and occurs in greater volume than those 
required in election processes (c). The quantity and complexity of the reports required in the simplest management 
information system (MIS) is much higher than the one required in an election (d). 
Therefore, it would be expected that even with the obstacles present in a developing country, an automatic election system 
would work quite well. And in fact it did in the case at hand. The bad reputation gained by the system developer had very 
little to do with the technological performance of the system.  
CASE COMMONALITIES 
When analyzing all the cases together we find that there are a few common elements in them. These common elements fit 
nicely into a pre-existing theoretical framework of information theory. The framework is one that looks into the dimensions 
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of information (e.g. Van der Lubbe 1997; Wersig 1996). We will first describe this theoretical framework and then proceed to 
show the commonalities using the framework’s terminology.  
Theoretical Framework: Dimensions of Information 
Many authors have developed frameworks to classify information per se. In general there are three concepts, types or 
dimensions of information. (1) Information as form, format, structure, or syntax. This is called the syntactical dimension of 
information. (2) Information as a symbol, a representation, a map, a reference, a description, news or data about people, 
things, or actions. This is called the semantic dimension of information. (3) Information as a signal, stimulus, or activation 
code to a behavior in an organism or system. This is called the pragmatic dimension of information (e.g. Mosterín 1991; 
Nauta 1972). Additionally, there is a fourth dimension. There is the matter that supports or holds the information. This is 
called the material dimension of information. 
The Syntactic Dimension of Information 
The syntactic dimension of information or syntactic information is the information as form. It is the structure and other 
characteristics that the receiver perceives from the signal (e.g. Morris 1971). It goes from primary characteristics like 
duration or tone of the acoustic signal to its length in quantity of individual symbols contained in it, to its grammatical 
structure. For example, the length of the message “Mary drives a car” or the grammatical structure of “Subject - Predicate”. 
Another example of syntactic information is a blank and unsigned check. The form that makes the check is the syntactic 
information of a payment order. Other common examples of syntactic information are the silhouette of a cloud, the lines in a 
drawing, the form of a letter, an abstract figure, and the double spiral of the DNA. 
The Semantic Dimension of Information 
The semantic dimension of information or semantic information is the information as meaning or representation of signals. It 
is the information as a signal that is connected (by association or some other mechanism) to a memory or to a group of 
signals previously stored in the memory of the recipient (e.g. Brier 1995; Carnap et al. 1952; Nauta 1972). In this manner, 
when the recipient receives the signal, he or she can recall a whole concept to which is linked. For example, the sound 
“Mary” becomes semantic information when the recipient can link it to a set of signals previously stored in his or her mind 
that may evoke that image of a given woman, her voice, her behavior, etcetera. Furthermore, if the signal is not simply 
“Mary” but “Mary drives a car” and the recipient also has memories related to the signals “drive” and “car” then the whole 
signal may evoke the image of a given woman driving a car (something that he or she may or may not have seen before). And 
if the evoked image is new, it can now be part of the memories available to the recipient in the future. Semantic information 
is a dataset that is copied from the knowledgebase or database of the sender to that of the receiver. Another example of 
semantic information is a complete and signed bank check that has not yet been presented to the bank. This check signifies 
that the undersigned orders the bank to pay a given sum of money to the beneficiary at any time on or after the date written 
on the check. Other common examples of semantic information are the name of an object, the map of a country, and the 
genetic code. 
The Pragmatic Dimension of Information 
The pragmatic dimension of information or pragmatic information is the information as cause of an effect. It is the signal that 
activates in the receiver an action, process, or behavior expected by the sender (Repo 1986). For example, the message with 
the order “Mary: Drive the car.” becomes pragmatic information as it directs or induces Mary to drive a car. Another example 
of pragmatic information is the check that, when presented to the bank, triggers the action in the bank teller to hand over a 
given amount of money to the individual presenting the check (who is also the beneficiary listed in the check).  In general, 
any form of currency may be considered pragmatic information as every time that money exchanges hand (accompanied 
maybe by some additional signals of specifications) it induces the recipient to provide a specific service or asset. Other 
common examples of pragmatic information are the access code to an account through an automated teller machine (ATM) 
and the set of genes that can start the formation of an individual. 
The Material Dimension of Information 
The material dimension of information or material support of the information is the matter that shows or holds the form or 
signal. For example, the ink and paper is the material support for printed letters and the hard drive is the material support for 
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the information stored in it. It is also the ink and paper of the bills (legal tender) and the plastic that makes-up credit cards. 
Taken to an extreme, it is any material object since they all show some shape.  
All information has a syntactic and material dimension. Some information may not have a semantic or a pragmatic 
dimension. 
Using the dimensions of information to see the commonalities in the cases 
Using the theoretically grounded framework of dimension of information, we argue that DeptoStore’s project covered the 
aspects of form –or syntax- and meaning –or semantic relationships- in respect to IT/IS. However, the pragmatic part of that 
information never came to life. The practical objective was never accomplished. IT/IS was present in the syntactic and 
semantic phase of FleetCo’s project. The IT/IS was properly installed and adapted to FleetCo’s requirements. However, the 
pragmatic phase of the project was not concluded. The subsystem was discarded. CountyGov’s project is clearly a case of 
under utilization of the acquired technology (an entire ERP just to do accounting); a case of low exploitation of the pragmatic 
dimension, clearly attributable to the general conditions of developing countries. 
In the case of the JudCourt, the State imported from developing countries only the syntactic and semantic aspects of the 
information of such good practice: the format of homologation and the relationship or meaning of such format over its 
dependencies. However, it did not import the pragmatic aspect; its practical implementation is not working. Some insiders 
say that the problem is nothing more than an internal fight for power, a fight that occurs in both developed and developing 
countries. However, while the power struggle may be very common and even more ruthless in developed countries, the 
organizational paralysis that occurs as a result of the struggle is much higher in less developed countries.  
In the case of the MultinatCo, the local branch observes the manuals, norms, and procedures. In other words, the syntactic 
and semantic aspects of the information related to the best practice. But the pragmatic aspect crashes into a condition that is 
assumed but that it does not occur: the capacity of the local representative of the supplying multinational company to provide 
the required products and services. In turn, this local representative imports the technology from its headquarters but in many 
cases it only brings the material support –CDs, manuals, CBTs- and not the required pragmatic knowledge for its employees. 
In the case of ElectoralGov it seems that accomplishing the pragmatic aspect of information technology is the factor of least 
importance in an implementation that takes place in a developing country. The political and sociological factors (formal 
aspects) that may be attributable to the system seem to be far more important than its efficiency or lack thereof in 
automatically processing the votes. 
Pragmatic fragility 
We find that the syntactic and semantic dimensions of information are accomplished in all the cases presented. On the other 
hand, most of them are lacking the pragmatic dimension. In the case that some of the pragmatic dimension is accomplished it 
is largely underestimated because in truth that was not what they expected.  Furthermore, we can expect that this 
underestimation on the part of the stakeholders of the rare pragmatic accomplishment is going to affect it negatively in the 
midterm. This will probably occur through the lack of maintenance or by stirring the next project towards what the 
stakeholders involved really value. As a result, the pragmatic digital divide is not reduced. Neither a deficient automation of 
good practices nor a successful automation of malpractices will reduce the breach. 
We also observe that the pragmatic fragility present in these cases is consistent with the infrastructural deficiencies easily 
found in less developed countries; deficiencies that other authors point to as the root for many of their problems (Simon 
2004). IT/IS is now present not only in rich nations but also in the very poor ones (Dutta et al. 2001). However, the pragmatic 
aspect of IT/IS requires the prior existence of organizations, systems, and people ready to interact accordingly. A purchase 
order with a valid credit card number cannot accomplish its objective if the receiver cannot deliver the requested product 
under the conditions specified (e.g. in a given time frame) or if there are no credible financial institutions capable of 
transferring the funds issued in payment to the seller’s account. 
Similarly, a weak, forgiving, or inefficient judicial system does not offer the trust required by individuals or corporations to 
open themselves to new or innovative technologies. The judicial system needs to provide fair and timely solutions. IT/IS is 
reducing the time it takes to do many things but if the judicial system is going to operate at a totally different pace, users will 
not risk using it (for a more comprehensive discussion of this point see for example Cowcher 2001). 
Users from places where the public and private industrial and service infrastructure have not reached the information 
revolution will hardly be able to have access to the pragmatic aspect of IT/IS (e.g. Anonymous 2001a; Anonymous 2001b; 
Mueller 1999). Users would not have the means, methods, and knowledge to control them.  
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Underdeveloped countries lack the infrastructure and institutions previously mentioned. They are characterized by a deficient 
industrial and service infrastructure. Their business practices are deficient when benchmarked with international standards.  
In essence, IT/IS in less developed countries is mainly used to establish “conversations” (where text, images, sound and any 
kind of digital information flow back and forth) but does not make or facilitate decisions that can be translated into actions: 
cash flow, exchange of merchandise, e-commerce, or replacement of a political/corporate leadership for another.  “A lot of 
talk but very little action” which in our terms means a lot of syntactic and semantic information but very little pragmatic 
information. This scarce and insecure pragmatic use of IT/IS is what we call pragmatic fragility. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The syntactic aspect of IT/IS comes in the form of contracts, budgets, agreements, RFPs, etcetera and is always present. The 
semantic aspect (the meaning) is generally present and fairly well managed. However, in less developed countries, the 
pragmatic aspect is the least accomplished (cases 1-4) and valued (case 5) making it the more fragile. This is due to the lack 
of a supporting infrastructure (transportation, culture, legal system, etc.) typical of those countries. Thus, pragmatic fragility 
seems to be characteristic of less developed countries. 
LIMITATIONS 
Quantitative research is needed to complement this study; however, since the lack of trustworthy statistics is commonplace in 
developing countries such study will be very hard to accomplish. Nonetheless there is a need for some form of triangulation 
that would provide confirmation of the conclusions made from the cases in this research (Gable 1994; Kaplan et al. 1998; Lee 
1991; Mingers 2001). 
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